economists are largely free to discuss how people trade to improve their lot.
"The predictive 'science of economics,'" Buchanan writes, "is positively valuable to government agents, business firms, and private individuals. Persons can 'play better games' if they can predict their opponents' strategy more accurately" (p. 33).
However, the realm of the "science of political economy" has, according to Buchanan, a much different purpose: "to evaluate the structure of the constraints, 'the law,' with some ultimate objective of redesign or reform aimed at securing enhanced efficiency in the exploitation of the potential mutuality of alternative systems" (p. 33). ,The science of (constitutional) political economy cannot sidestep normative matters or even the question of how alternative systems of constraints can and should be evaluated.
Throughout the book, Buchanan espouses general agreement as the critical normative test for adoptions of social systems or reforms in those systems:
Cato Journal, Vol.6, No.2 (Fall 1986 The task of the economist is to correctly predict how people will behave, given exogenous policy or market changes, The task of the political economist, on the other hand, is to devise reforms in the system so relevant parties can achieve meaningful consent: "If I cannot come up with some such proposal for change, I should be forced to acknowledge that the existing state of affairs is Wicksell efficient [Pareto optimal] no matter how much my own dislike for this state of affairs may be" (p.80). Such an admonition applies to reform of the federal debt problem, discussed over the course of several chapters, or reform of the welfare state, a basic concern of almost all the chapters. While the reader will quickly sense that Buchanan has definite and strong views on what specific reforms should be considered, he repeatedly attempts to stay detached from policy proposals in order to keep the focus of his analysis on the conceptualized criteria and process for reform.
Second, Buchanan seeks in Liberty, Market and the State to divert the attention of economists from the "science of economics" to the "science of political economy." He wants to elevate the importance of the "rules of the game" as a standard for judging the fairness and justice of specific behavior of individuals, acting alone and in groups, and of specific government policies. Imbued with theiracademic training in calculatingthe costs and benefits assumed by their hypothetical homo economicus, many economists have grown accustomed to assuming the absence ofany external criteria forjudging people's behavior. Indeed, most economists know colleagues who maintain that virtually any trade, regardless of whether it violates agreed-upon rules, has moral content simply because it is, at the time, mutually beneficial to the parties involved. Hence, crime is "wrong" only to the extent it may not pay.
Alumni making side payments to college athletes is "right" because athletic talent is allocated more efficiently by such payments. Federal deficits have no moral content. The reader will hardly finish this book without repeatedly being reminded that the moral worth of individual and group actions can be judged by the extent to which they are consistent with basic principles.
The essential message ofBuchanan's writings during the 1980s is remarkably simple: Rules (formal or informal) matter, They restrain people's shortrun temptation to veer fiom their individual and collective long-run interests.
They also matter as an important, if not penultimate, normative standard. This theme, which is a throwback to the Founders, will probably go down as James Buchanan's major contribution to modern social philosophy. It is at the heart of constitutional political economy, which may some day rival the technocratic science of economics as the preferred intellectual interest of economists,
